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Abstract 
 
This paper takes as a starting point the proposition that social protection interventions 
involving food can be used to promote transformational change in family farming systems in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The purpose is to highlight the complexity of pathways to agricultural 
transformation associated with the seemingly simple idea of home-grown school feeding 
(HGSF), an idea that is increasingly held up as “win-win”.  By reviewing the HGSF literature 
and the main theories underpinning it – structured demand, localism, family farmer 
development  – we expose areas of inconsistency across the literature and programmes as 
well as possible tensions that may arise in attempting to pursue both market and social 
objectives in the same initiative.  The arguments presented herein aim to provide a basis for 
moving towards clarity on (1) a theory of change for HGSF programmes; (2) the conditions 
under which HGSF programmes are more able to yield positive agricultural development 
outcomes and; (3) an agenda for moving forward on research and impact evaluation.  This 
research agenda also speaks more broadly to important under-researched areas within the 
general social protection and agricultural development discourse. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Interest in “win-win” solutions and the recent convergence of policy debates relating to 
agriculture and social protection draw attention to the relationship between agricultural 
development and social protection interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  The 
conventional view is that agricultural policies promote productivity enhancement and 
income growth, while social protection seeks to stabilise yields and consumption (especially 
when production fails).  However this view is being challenged by emerging evidence which 
suggests that in some contexts both objectives can be achieved with a single instrument 
(Dorward et al. 2006; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2009).  Interlinking of “social” and “economic” 
policies for poor farmers was anticipated by debates in the 1990s around “linking relief and 
development” and “productivity-enhancing safety nets”.  However this link has been 
brought into sharper focus by the “colonisation” of many traditional agricultural policy 
instruments by social protection, including crop insurance, agricultural input subsidies and 
even grain futures markets (Dorward et al. 2006).   
 
School feeding is a classic and well established “provisioning” type of social protection 
programme.  By providing children with meals, snacks or take-home rations, school feeding 
programmes seek first and foremost to overcome food and nutritional deficiencies.  
However, the fact that school feeding can also improve enrolment (particularly for girls) and 
learning outcomes (Bundy et al. 2009, Kristjansson et al. 2007) suggests that over the 
medium to long term it could have important promotional as well as transformational 
effects (i.e. by building human capital and/or empowering girls relative to boys by 
overcoming educational access bias).1 
 
In recent years there have been signs of a significant shift in thinking about school feeding 
(Morgan and Sonnino 2008; Bundy et al. 2009), and many elements of this new thinking are 
being actively promoted under the rubric of “home grown school feeding” (HGSF) (Espejo et 
al. 2009).  HGSF is of particular interest as it provides an example of an intervention that 
claims to have the potential to deliver the positive linkages or synergies between social 
protection and agricultural development referred to above.   
 
HGSF has been defined in a variety of ways (e.g. Espejo et al. 2009; Morgan et al. 2007; and 
the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP))2, but the 
common element that links these various definitions is the notion that HGSF attempts to 
actively and explicitly link agricultural development with school feeding.3  There is less 
agreement in relation to the scale at which this linkage might take place (the terms “local”, 
“within a country” and “domestically produced” are all used, sometimes interchangeably) 
and the linkage mechanisms themselves are seldom specified (Sumberg and Sabates-
Wheeler 2010). 
 
Over the last five years HGSF has received increasing attention from international agencies 
(Sanchez et al. 2005), funders, national policy makers and governments, academics (Morgan 
                                               
1
 See Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux (2009) for a discussion of the different functions of social 
protection. 
2
 CAADP is NEPAD’s Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (www.nepad-
caadp.net/).  The programme’s Pillar 3 (Food supply and hunger) specifically highlights home-grown 
school feeding (http://www.nepad-caadp.net/pillar-3.php). 
3
 Some proponents suggest that school gardens can or should be a considered a component of HGSF, 
despite the fact that time spent gardening may not be consistent with the objectives of schooling.  
Here we do not consider school gardens as part of HGSF. 
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et al. 2007) and practitioners (Espejo et al. 2009).  The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF) has funded or co-funded some of these activities as well as other closely related 
initiatives such as the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Purchase-for-Progress (P4P) 
programme.4 Outline information on three on-going HGSF programmes is given in Table 1.  It 
is clear that these programmes are quite different in important ways: there is unified model 
of HGSF. 
 
Those who argue that HGSF can successfully deliver both social protection and agricultural 
development draws heavily from experiences in Chile and Brazil (Morgan et al. 2007; Espejo 
et al. 2009).  In relation to SSA the narrative that is commonly used to justify the promotion 
of the HGSF approach has three parts as follows: 
 
1. The agricultural sector and the livelihoods of family farmers in SSA can be 
transformed for the better through greater engagement with markets. 
 
2. This transformational potential is presently constrained by the failure of input and 
output markets, poor infrastructure and sub-optimal use of productivity enhancing 
technology. 
 
3. However, by “structuring” demand in ways that make it easier, less risky and more 
profitable for family farmers to engage with markets, and by providing an array of 
complimentary services (training, credit, access to technology), food procurement 
for social protection programmes (such as school feeding) can be used to kick start 
this market-based transformational process. 
 
This paper uses the case of HGSF to explore the proposition that social protection and 
agricultural growth can be achieved through a single intervention.  Given the increasing 
interest in (and significant resources devoted to) HGSF as a tool for positive agricultural 
change, as well as the dearth of empirical evidence on the validity of the HGSF proposition, 
our paper intends to make a critical, timely and constructive contribution. Specifically, we 
aim to unpack the theory and assumptions underlying the HGSF agenda and situate notions 
of “structured demand” and “localisation” within the appropriate literatures in order to 
draw lessons that bear on HGSF.  The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we 
elaborate and explore the theory of change underlying HGSF.  We then use this theory to 
identify the potential benefits that could be associated with HGSF and ask if, how, when, 
where and for whom these benefits are likely to be “transformative”.  The paper concludes 
with some suggestions for further research.  The focus throughout is on sub-Saharan Africa. 
                                               
4 http://www.wfp.org/purchase-progress  
4 
 
Table 1. Three on-going HGSF programmes 
 Location 
 Ghana Osun State, Nigeria Kenya 
Programme name Ghana School Feeding Programme Home Grown School Feeding & Health Kenya Home-Grown School Meals 
Stated objective (s)  Development objective: contribute 
to poverty reduction & food 
security. 
 Immediate objective:  boost 
domestic food production. 
 
(GSFP AOP, 2009) 
 
 Hunger & poverty reduction 
 Improvement of nutritional & health 
status of school children 
 Increasing school enrolment, 
retention & completion 
 Enhancement of agricultural 
productivity  
 Elimination of post harvest losses 
 Stimulating job creation, local food 
production & income of small holder 
farmers 
 Strengthening of capacity of local 
communities 
 Stimulating development of small 
scale industries 
 To strengthen the capacity of 
stakeholders at all levels to 
implement school health, nutrition 
& meals programmes. 
 To have a framework to regulate, 
coordinate & ensure standards in 
implementation of school health, 
nutrition & meals programmes. 
 To enhance a comprehensive, 
effective, efficient & sustainable 
monitoring & evaluation system. 
 
(Kenya HGSF ITGM, 2009) 
Coverage  2009 plan called for feeding 656,624 
pupils in all 170 districts 
 129,000 children, kindergarten 
through Primary 2, in all 1,351 public 
schools in Osun State 
 538,000 children in 1,700 schools in 
28 semi-arid districts 
Implementation 
strategy 
 Through District Assemblies 
 Caterer at school-level responsible 
for procurement & preparation of 
food 
 One cook per 50 students 
 Food purchased by cooks at local 
markets 
 Cash transfer to cooks’ bank 
accounts every two weeks 
 Competitive tendering for food & 
transport with registered farmers & 
suppliers 
 Coordinated by local school meals 
committees 
Funding  Government of Ghana  
 Bi-lateral funding from Netherlands 
 State & local government  Government of Kenya 
 Bi-lateral funding from Japan 
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2. Theory of change 
 
As highlighted above and depicted schematically in Figure 1, the theory underpinning HGSF 
is that the social protection benefits and the agricultural development benefits associated 
with HGSF – working in parallel and interacting – will be powerful enough to kick start the 
transformation of agriculture and subsequently of rural livelihoods in SSA.  In this section we 
explore the agricultural development aspects of this theory in more detail. 
 
Figure 1. Linking social protection to agricultural benefits: a win-win scenario? 
 
 Figure 1 here 
 
The HGSF theory of change combines ideas from two sources.  The first is essentially the 
current orthodoxy about agricultural development in SSA5, while the second is a set of ideas 
around the strategic use of public procurement, “demand-assisted growth” and economic 
localisation.  The theory of change brings together elements from these two sources in eight 
logical steps as follows:  
 
1. Agricultural growth is essential for broad-based poverty reduction in SSA. 
 
2. Agricultural growth will come about through increased engagement with input and 
output markets, which will stimulate technical change and result in productivity 
enhancement. 
 
3. The greatest poverty reduction impact of this “market engagement – agricultural 
growth – poverty reduction” linkage will come via a focus on small or family farms. 
 
4. A major block to greater market engagement by family farmers is the fact that in 
much of rural SSA input and output markets are thin, seasonal and poorly governed; 
infrastructure is poor etc. 
 
5. These market constraints can be addressed by using the public sector demand for 
food associated with social protection programmes (like school feeding) to drive a 
demand-assisted agricultural growth strategy.  The demand for this food can be 
“structured” so that it is easier, less costly and less risky for specific target groups 
within the population of family farmers to engage with input and output markets. 
 
6. Social protection programmes involving food are prime candidates for a structured 
demand approach for two reasons: there is growing recognition among both funders 
and recipient countries of the benefits of substituting domestically produced 
commodities for food aid and imported commodities; demand is highly predictable 
and thus amenable to a structuring process that will reduce the uncertainty and risk 
associated with family farmers’ engagement with food markets. 
 
7. The provision of complimentary services (training, credit, access to inputs and 
technology) can be linked to the process of structuring demand. 
 
                                               
5
 An alternative to this orthodoxy is put forward by the “food sovereignty” movement (Martinez-
Torres and Rosset 2010).   
6 
 
8. Thus, the use of structured demand to supply school feeding programmes is an 
attractive avenue through which to kick start a process of agricultural and livelihood 
transformation. 
The notion that public sector procurement can serve as a powerful tool to advance 
economic development (e.g. through small enterprise development) is well established.  
However, to date this notion has not been given a prominent place in agricultural 
development policy in SSA.  Similarly, with the exception of some smaller-scale NGO 
programmes and WFP’s relatively recent Purchase-for-Progress initiative, localisation 
strategies and structured demand have not figured prominently within agricultural 
development programmes in SSA.   
 
There is some obvious resonance between the HGSF theory of change and the literature on 
balanced and unbalanced growth (see Lipton 1962; Kremer 1963) especially in relation to 
structured demand; the centrality of the state’s involvement in this structuring; the 
multiplier effects, and; the presumed supply response.  In effect, the dominant assumption 
underpinning the success of HGSF is that output incentives will induce an investment 
response and that this will lead to growth in and outside the agricultural sector. Tendler and 
Amorim (1996) described this approach in terms of “demand-assisted growth”.  More 
recently, the role of public procurement in promoting sustainability, environmental and 
social agendas has been highlighted in both the North (e.g. Eckersley 2004; McCrudden 
2004) and the South (Bolton 2008; Geng and Doberstein 2008).  The basic proposition is that 
the immense purchasing power of the state can be used in a strategic, pro-active and 
innovative manner to favour different suppliers, regions and products – and ultimately 
transformative outcomes – compared to more standard “least cost” or “value for money” 
procurement approaches.  The particular example of procurement of food for schools has 
been explored in some detail (Morgan 2008; Morgan and Sonnino 2008; Sonnino 2009).   
 
The second novel element of the HGSF theory of change relates to the rise of interest in the 
processes of economic localisation, which has been portrayed by some observers as a 
reaction to the era of globalisation.  While the notions local and localisation are problematic 
from both conceptual and operational perspectives, it has nevertheless been suggested that 
efforts to localise (or re-localise) economic activity could or should be the centre-piece of 
development programmes addressing issues such as unemployment, inequality and 
vulnerability to climate change.  Thinking along these lines is also central to the “food 
sovereignty” agenda and its alternative vision for agriculture and rural development 
worldwide (Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2010).  The social, economic and environmental 
implications of re-localisating food and food systems have received particular attention over 
the last decade (Winter 2003; Hinrichs 2003; DuPuis and Goodman 2005; Born and Purcell 
2006).6  The movement toward domestic (and regional) procurement of food aid can also be 
seen in the light of new understandings of the range of benefits (i.e. to farmers, traders, 
transporters and food aid beneficiaries) that can be derived from more localised public food 
procurement strategies (Maxwell 2007; del Ninno et al. 2007; Lentz and Barrett 2008; 
Tadesse and Shively 2009). 
 
The third novel element addresses the conventional wisdom that in much of rural SSA the 
positive link between market engagement and investment in technology fails to materialise 
because agricultural input and output markets are thin and poorly governed, supporting 
institutions (e.g. providing research, extension and credit) are “weak” and many rural areas 
                                               
6
 There are many claims and counter-claims associated with local food  e.g. in relation to freshness, 
flavour, health benefits, relative environmental impacts etc. – see Edwards-Jones et al. (2008) for a 
recent review.   
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are poorly served by transportation and communications infrastructure (Poulton et al. 
2006). This analysis can be seen in terms of coordination risk, which Dorward and Kydd 
(2004) define as “the risk of failure of one player’s investment due to the possible absence of 
complementary investments by other players in different stages in the supply chain.”  
Coordination risk is particularly prevalent where there are thin markets and weak 
institutions.  From the perspective of those interested in pro-poor agricultural development 
in SSA, “the central coordination challenge… is… how to develop supply chain systems that 
provide smallholders with access to the range of pre-harvest services that they require at 
the same time as enhancing their access to remunerative output market opportunities” 
(Dorward et al. 2005).  For Barrett (2008, p.300), “One thus has to get institutions and 
endowments, as well as prices, ‘right’ in order to induce market-based development”.   
 
In the context of HGSF, coordination risk is addressed via structured demand.  While this 
term is relatively new we argue that it has a long intellectual and policy pedigree, and 
probably links most directly to ideas and experience around “small-enterprise favouring 
procurement”, “demand-driven models” and “demand-assisted [small enterprise] growth” 
(Tendler and Amorim 1996).  These are in contrast to “supply-driven approaches” which 
“specialize in providing one or more ongoing services - credit, courses in business 
management, or technical assistance. They try to serve as many firms and as many sectors 
as possible” (Tendler and Amorim 1996).  While these two approaches are not unrelated – 
clearly the ambition of a demand-assisted approach is to stimulate a supply-side response – 
but the critical question is which side (demand or supply) drives the intervention.  To the 
extent that the supply side response is constrained through the coordination failures there 
may be a need to provide complementary services (e.g. training, credit and technical 
assistance) as part of a demand-driven model. 
 
Drawing on these earlier experiences and linking them to the current interest in the use of 
structured markets or structured demand to drive HGSF (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
2008, 2009) we suggest that structured demand can be conceived of as demand-side market 
interventions that have the explicit objective of reducing coordination risk and specifically 
the barriers to entry and/or transactions costs faced by specific groups of potential 
suppliers.  These demand-side interventions seek to create significant additional demand 
that is predictable over time.7  Depending on the circumstances they may be accompanied 
by supply-side measures (e.g. giving access to information, new technology, credit, training 
etc) and other longer-term, less-direct interventions (e.g. in relation to policy processes).  
While there are examples of private sector and NGO initiatives that could be described as 
using a structured demand approach, as a strategic development intervention the greatest 
potential would seem to sit with public sector procurement.  
 
Operationally, demand is structured through procurement systems and procedures.  The 
aspects that can be used to structure demand so as to encourage or facilitate engagement 
by family farmers include the specification of: 
 
 The type, intrinsic qualities (e.g. quality standards etc) and extrinsic qualities (e.g. type of 
producer or geographical area of production) of the commodities to be purchased 
 The quantity to be purchased (including number and size of lots ) 
 Delivery requirements (e.g. place, quantity, frequency, packaging) 
                                               
7
 By “additional demand” we mean an increase in demand that is potentially satisfied by local family 
farmers.  Thus, in the case of an existing school feeding programme where all food is presently 
imported, a shift to domestic procurement would be considered “additional demand” even though 
the total food consumed would not change. 
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 The mechanism for price determination 
 Any minimum requirements to become a “registered” or “licensed” supplier; any other 
restrictions on who can tender  
 Contract details (e.g. mode and frequency of payment, upfront payments, default 
penalties, insurance requirements and so on) 
 
In Figure 2 we bring the various elements of the HGSF theory of change into a single model.  
This model posits that by using a structured demand approach to make strategic use of 
public procurement, the local economy will be stimulated by the flow of direct benefits 
primarily to targeted groups, and indirect benefits, via multiplier and spill-over effects, to 
the local population mere widely.8  Fundamental to any view of HGSF as potentially 
transformative is the idea that it can act to kick start the cycle of economic activity depicted 
at the bottom of the figure.  If HGSF is to live up to its billing, over the medium to long term, 
and eventually without the direct stimulus provided by HGSF programmes, this cycle must 
generate levels of opportunity and incentive sufficient to transform the agricultural sector 
and the rural livelihoods that are dependent upon it. 
 
Figure 2. The HGSF model: theory of change 
 
< Figure 2 here   > 
 
3. Benefits & beneficiaries 
 
In the light of the theory of change outlined above, in this section we look at agricultural and 
economic development benefits potentially associated with HGSF.  These benefits can be 
divided between those that are direct (arising from expenditure for the purchase of food 
and additional marketing and income opportunities for food producers and suppliers) and 
those that are indirect (arising through spill-over and multiplier effects) (Table 2).  They can 
also be divided between those that relate to income and those that relate to capital 
formation (i.e. human and social capital). 
 
The procurement model used and the scale of HGSF purchases will determine the magnitude 
of direct benefits (increased income, income smoothing, human capital formation) and how 
these benefits are distributed between producers and other supply chain actors.  In addition, 
the distribution of benefits within these groups of actors, as well as their spatial distribution 
will depend on how effectively any targeting strategy is operationalised through the 
procurement system.   
                                               
8
 A number of commentators have already noted that if not handled carefully, attempts to establish 
this virtuous cycle through HGSF could potentially result in negative impacts.  For example, if a 
programme’s demand for food is large relative to the size of the “local” market, and there is no 
immediate supply response, prices could be driven up with negative consequences for poor people 
who rely on the same market for food provisioning (Stoppa (2007) modelled several scenarios along 
these lines).  One obvious conclusion is that context and scale considerations must figure prominently 
in programme design.  Similarly, if HGSF programmes offer a “limited” demand with a premium over 
local market prices, then it is highly likely that those producers or traders who 1) have ‘know-how’ 
about procurement systems and the associated paper work; 2) have political connections; and 3) can 
more readily assure quality, will be more likely to gain the market, and that this favourable position 
may become exacerbated overtime. Thus, the very process of setting up a system that is supposed to 
benefit poor family farmers, may in fact lead to exclusion of exactly those farmers from the process. 
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Table 2. Direct and indirect agricultural and economic development benefits potentially associated with HGSF 
Type Benefit Beneficiaries Mechanism Benefit dependent on 
Direct Increased income 
Producers 
&/or 
other supply chain 
actors 
Increased amount sold 
 
Increase productivity 
The net additional demand represented by HGSF purchases; 
proportion of marketed produce represented by HGSF 
purchases 
 
Supply response 
 
Effectiveness of market mechanism(s) 
 
Access to appropriate training, credit & technology 
Direct 
Reduction in risk; more stable  
income 
Producers 
&/or 
other supply chain 
actors 
Predictability of demand 
Proportion of marketed produce represented by HGSF 
purchases 
 
Effectiveness of market mechanism(s) 
Direct Human capital formation 
Producers 
&/or 
other food chain 
actors 
Experience, training & capacity 
building activities 
Availability of appropriate & effective technical training 
Indirect Increased income 
People seeking jobs / 
wages 
 
Providers of non-
food goods & 
services  
 
Producers & other 
food chain actors 
 
Consumers 
Additional jobs / wages (via 
multiplier effects) 
 
Increased demand (via multiplier 
effects) 
 
Increased demand for food (via 
multiplier effects) 
 
Lower food prices (via spill-over 
effects) 
Supply response to HGSF 
 
Marginal labour requirements (e.g. by commodity & 
production system); quantities of commodities purchased by 
HGSF; wage levels 
 
Consumption preferences 
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Indirect Social capital formation 
Producers 
&/or 
other food chain 
actors 
Experience of working together 
to fulfil contract (via spill-over 
effects) 
Procurement strategy 
 
Correct incentives being in place 
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The indirect benefits associated with an intervention such as HGSF could be many, widely 
distributed, and might be expected to develop over a long time frame.  Some will certainly 
be unintended and unforeseen.  The literature on local economy effects (Cooper and John 
1988)  is critical to understanding these indirect benefits and the pathways (and constraints) 
by which structured demand and thereby HGSF, is able to effect broader agricultural change 
and transformation.   
 
3.1.  Factors moderating potential benefits 
 
The level and distribution of the potential direct and indirect benefits identified in Table 1 
are mediated by a number of factors.  We consider four of these below. 
  
3.1.1. Procurement strategies and spatial distribution of actors and benefits 
 
As structured demand is operationalised through procurement strategies, policies and 
procedures, it follows that the objectives and design characteristics of the procurement system 
will to a considerable degree determine the potential of HGSF programmes to deliver agricultural 
development benefits to family farmers.  The degree to which this potential is realised will 
ultimately depend on how effectively the particular procurement system is implemented.  
Ultimately every procurement system entails multiple trade-offs, and it should be expected that 
the direct and indirect agricultural development benefits identified previously will be part of the 
trade-off calculus.  It is not realistic or appropriate to assume that stimulating agricultural 
development can or should be the primary objective of a HGSF procurement system: rather, the 
primary objectives must be the provision a reliable supply of safe, appropriate food at a 
reasonable cost. Lipton (1962) makes a similar point in relation to balanced and unbalanced 
growth. These theories assume once-for-all State intervention; but they ignore the 
possibility of sustained reforms, initiated by the State, during the proposed development 
process.  He argues that these ‘demand-focussed’ theories neglect the really ‘radical’ needs 
of development. For instance, do producers have access to the physical supplies they need 
to expand output in the face of higher demand?  The central focus on demand assumes that 
resources are available and ‘latent’ producers simply need incentives to produce and 
become entrepreneurial.  However, oftentimes resources are scarce.  Low labour 
productivity, lack of knowledge, training, irrigation, fertiliser, etc, means that the supply of 
productive factors cannot rise in response to demand.  
 
To illustrate the variety of procurement approaches that are being used in newly initiated 
HGSF programmes in SSA we sketch out three examples below.  Each of these systems 
would have some claim to delivering HGSF, although presumably with different costs and 
resulting in different levels and distributions of agricultural development benefits: 
 
 A cook, employed by a single school, goes to the nearby market on a weekly basis to 
purchase maize, cowpeas, oil and condiments.  She negotiates with different traders in 
the market to get the best quality—price combination and pays them in cash. 
 
 After a public tendering process a school district signs a contract with a nearby farmers 
association to supply a specified quantity of “locally produced” maize and cowpeas per 
month throughout the school year.  A minimum price is set, but the contract specifies 
that if at the time of delivery the “market price” is higher the minimum price, the 
producers association will be paid the market price + 10%.  There is no provision for 
advance payment.  The goods are collected by the school district every month and 
delivered to individual schools.  Oil, condiments, vegetables and other perishables are 
purchased by the school cook from the local market as outlined above. 
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 A national education ministry mandates its procurement office to publish a call for 
tenders in the national newspaper to supply, distribute and prepare food for a national 
school feeding programme.  The call specifies that a minimum of 50% of all food must be 
produced domestically (within national borders) and that a suitable system must be put 
in place to monitor the proportion of domestic produce.  The successful bidders must 
provide indemnity against default, and payments are made to the supplier one month in 
arrears. 
 
Ultimately the interest is in understanding the effects of structuring demand through 
different procurement models, which, as seen in the three examples above, immediately 
highlights the spatial relations around HGSF.  We can identify two potential spatial variables 
that might be important in relation to the level, type and/or distribution of benefits arising 
from HGSF.  These are the degree to which producers are clustered and the proximity of 
producers to point of consumption.  Combining these gives three spatial configurations: 
 
1. Producers clustered; consumers nearby: e.g. a very decentralised model of school-level 
procurement primarily from nearby producers; 
 
2. Producers clustered; consumers distant: e.g. a more centralised model where food is 
procured from clustered farmers in food surplus areas and shipped to distant schools; 
 
3. Producers not clustered: e.g. a centralised model where food is procured with no 
specification of origin and shipped to distant schools. 
 
Configuration 1 implies a very close link between the sites of production and consumption, 
which might be important in meeting local taste or quality preferences, in supplying very 
isolated schools or in supplying fresh or perishable produce.  Configurations 1 and 2 allow 
for the clustering of producers and thus open the way for “peer monitoring, shared 
information and learning, quality control, group purchase, skills upgrading and backward and 
forward linkages”, which Tendler and Amorim (1996) suggested were particularly important 
for demand-assisted small growth strategies.  Configuration 2 and 3 imply more centralised 
procurement systems operating at larger scales and handling greater quantities, and are 
likely to require a more prominent role for intermediaries in the supply chain.  Configuration 
3 gives the greatest room to manoeuvre in terms of choice, quality, price etc. but is not very 
amenable to e.g. group learning and social capital formation amongst producers, and would 
likely make the provision of any accompanying supply-side measures both difficult and 
expensive. 
 
A further implication of spatial configurations of HGSF relates to price effects.  Local prices 
will depend both on market integration and on the size of the band between regions 
producing and consuming.  For instance, local prices, both for the producer and the school, 
will depend on 1) whether the gain is being produced in a surplus or deficit region; 2) the 
transaction cost of exporting the food; 3) the price differential between where the food is 
produced and where it is consumed; and 4) the scale of food being introduced into local 
markets.  
 
3.1.2. Thresholds and scale effects 
 
HGSF seeks to achieve agricultural development and social protection objectives through 
one instrument, and because of this in many situations it will be necessary to undertake 
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complimentary activities to enable poorer farmers to increase their engagement with 
markets.  This is likely to require the programme (or an associated agency) subsidising 
training, providing technology “starter packs” or other complementary inputs and credit.  In 
many ways this can be viewed as “protectionism” – i.e. shielding family farmers from full 
force of the market while they obtain some market advantage.  This protectionism implicitly 
recognises that many poorer family farmers face initial thresholds (in relation to assets, 
training, income, etc), below which they are unable to compete in a market environment.  If 
it is to have the desired transformative effects the HGSF model must help push households 
over these thresholds.  However, this can be challenging as vulnerability often arises 
because farm households are constrained by multiple thresholds simultaneously.  
 
Thresholds imply non-linear effects, such that livelihoods are particularly sensitive or 
vulnerable to changes over particular ranges of certain variables.  Three thresholds 
illuminate possible synergies and conflicts between agricultural and social protection 
policies.  As well as the asset thresholds (Carter and Barrett 2007) where certain 
combinations or numbers of assets are needed to engage in certain livelihood activities (e.g. 
two oxen for ploughing), there are price thresholds and market thresholds. Price thresholds 
occur where an activity only becomes worthwhile above a particular price.  Market 
thresholds occur where low volumes and numbers of market players lead to high 
coordination risks and transaction costs.  This sets up a vicious circle involving low levels of 
economic activity with few market players and low market volumes, high transport and 
communication costs, high transaction risks and costs, weak contractual enforcement 
institutions, high physical and market risks, and supply chain investment disincentives and 
failures (Dorward and Kydd 2005).  All of these constraints on rural livelihoods reinforce the 
argument made earlier in this paper, that there is a logical convergence between agricultural 
policy and social protection policy – interventions in assets, prices or markets could benefit 
both agricultural production and household food security.  In other words, it may not be 
sufficient to intervene on assets, or prices or markets alone.  These are important 
considerations for any HGSF programme. 
 
3.1.3.  Policy complementarities and sequencing effects 
 
Building on their development coordination hypothesis and drawing on experience from 
Malawi, Dorward and Kydd (2005) argue that input, output and financial markets are very 
thin for goods and services in many family farming areas.  Moreover, trading costs are high, 
information services are costly and there is a high risk of transaction failures for buyers and 
sellers.  To cover these imperfections and risks, prices are high which depresses demand.  
The effect of these conditions as well as the risks associated with variable prices and yields is 
to trap different players in the supply chains into low-level equilibrium activities and 
perpetuate widespread market failure: “Specific supply chains needed for rural people to 
intensify farm production or to start adequately capitalized non-farm enterprises tend to be 
absent or very weak” (Dorward and Kydd 2005, p.262). 
 
While there has been much debate around the causes and lessons that can be learned from 
Malawi’s 2001/02 food crisis, Dorward et al. (2006), based on the analysis outlined above, 
use this example to suggest a three-step or sequenced approach to food security and rural 
poverty reduction: 
 
1. ensuring immediate food security requires policies that will work in the absence of 
effective markets, implying a dominant role for social safety nets (where the choice 
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between cash and food transfers must be based on sound market analysis) and less 
focus on economic growth; 
 
2. in the medium-term there is a need to develop effective markets and rural 
infrastructure, while maintaining social protection measures that are sensitive to local 
market conditions; 
 
3. in the longer term, once markets and traders are well established and rural 
infrastructure is in place, then market-based policies can be increasingly relied upon to 
promote food security and rural economic growth. 
 
The crucial point is that sets of policies must be selected that complement each other in 
achieving short- and long-term objectives, and they should be adjusted over time as 
circumstances change.  In other words, apparent policy synergies between welfare 
improvements and pro-poor agricultural growth must be exploited sensitively depending on 
prevailing conditions and evolving priorities at the time.  Furthermore, policy instruments 
need to complement each other at different stages of market development.  Sometimes 
instruments will need to be largely non-market based, but at other times the appropriate 
instruments will be predominantly market based. 
 
The implication of this argument for HGSF and its ambition to transform agriculture is that it 
must be located within a broader, long-term development strategy in which policies relating 
to input and output markets, as well as investments in infrastructure and agricultural 
research, are tightly coordinated and logically sequenced. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
We introduced this paper with reference to the notion that social protection interventions 
involving food can be used to promote transformational change in family farming systems.  
Having outlined the theory of change underlying one such intervention – home-grown 
school feeding – we then examined the types of agricultural development benefits that 
might be expected to arise and some of the factors that might moderate these benefits.   
 
This analysis has highlighted the complexity of pathways to agricultural transformation 
associated within the seemingly simple idea of HGSF.  So, while there in increasing interest 
in and enthusiasm for HGSF, whether, and in what situations, HGSF is likely to stimulate a 
transformation in family farming are open questions that demand further theoretical and 
empirical attention.  An almost complete lack of data on the operation of these programmes 
in SSA limits empirical analysis, and any evaluation programmes that are put in place will 
need to take account of the many potential pathways for positive change that were 
identified above.   
 
The tendency is to call on notions of “win-win” and synergy to present HGSF as a single 
intervention that can address both social protection and agricultural development 
objectives.  An alternative is to see HGSF as two separate instruments (school feeding and 
structured demand) addressing two independent policy objectives (child welfare and 
agricultural development).  By explicitly separating school feeding from structured demand 
this conception can help focus attention on the details of procurement as the main 
intervention driving agricultural change.  It should also help facilitate more meaningful 
evaluation of HGSF programmes. 
 
15 
 
Another area where much greater clarity is required is around the use of the word local in 
relation to HGSF.  This word is central to HDSF discourse: in Home Grown: The New Era of 
School Feeding (Morgan et al. 2007) it appears 838 times (in 477 pages), while in Home-
Grown School Feeding: A Framework to Link School Feeding with Local Agricultural 
Production  (Espejo et al. 2009) it is used 124 times (in 80 pages).  However neither 
document spells out clearly what is meant by local.  Rather, depending on the context it is 
used to refer to within the boundary of the village or area surrounding a single school, or at 
the other extreme, to within the national boundary of the country within which the same 
school sits.  As highlighted above, the spatial dimensions of the school feeding and 
structured demand sides of HGSF will to some extent determine the type, magnitude and 
distribution of any agricultural benefits, and thus continued ambiguity around a term as 
central as local is untenable.9  
 
In the remainder of this section we identify areas where additional research would 
contribute to a better understanding of the agricultural development potential of HGSF.  
These areas also represent important gaps in understanding of the more general social 
protection and agricultural development overlap. 
 
4.1. Are family farmers the same as SMEs? 
 
We have argued that the interest in structured demand as a central component of HGSF can 
be linked to broader experience using demand-assisted strategies to promote SME 
development.  Tendler and Amorim’s (1996) analysis of examples from northeast Brazil is 
particularly compelling, and from it they drew five key lessons as to how successful demand-
assisted growth strategies should be operationalised: 
 
 Procurement units should not be required to buy from small firms: rather, working with 
a “support agency” these firms must prove they can deliver at the same price and 
quality as that of the government’s existing suppliers. 
 
 Procurement units should contract only with groups of firms, with individual firms being 
paid only upon delivery and satisfactory inspection of the product of the whole group.  
 
 Procurement units must be willing to make a substantial part of the payment to 
suppliers up front. 
 
 Support functions must be kept separate from procurement functions. 
 
 The support agency must earn a small commission on the contract 
 
But are these lessons, drawn from experiences with small businesses in Brazil, relevant to 
family farmers in SSA?  In what ways are family farmers analogous to SMEs?10   In some 
respects these questions hark back to earlier framings and debates that portrayed farmers in 
SSA as “subsistence oriented” and “peasants” on the one hand, or “capitalist farmers” on 
the others.  More recent framings, including those favoured by CAADP and AGRA, highlight 
the entrepreneurial spirit of Africa’s family farmers, while others focus on the fact that 
                                               
9
 This same ambiguity around the term local is found in much of the broader literature on sustainable 
and alternative food.  Born and Purcell (2006) provide an provocative analysis of what they term “the 
local trap”. 
10
 Most definitions of micro, small or medium enterprises in SSA implicitly or explicitly exclude family 
farms (see Rogerson (2001) and Abor & Quartey (2010)). 
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farming is only one element of increasingly diversified livelihoods.  In contrast, the food 
sovereignty movement draws on the earlier images of a self-sufficient peasantry.  All of 
these framings are however homogenising to an extreme. In relation to HGSF the key 
questions are which family farmers have the entrepreneurial characteristic of SMEs, and are 
they the same farmers as those who are targeted to benefit from the transformative effects 
of structured demand? 
 
4.2. Devolution and structured demand 
 
The notions of “community ownership” and “community control” loom large in the HGSF 
literature and in discourse around most national HGSF programmes in SSA.  While 
mechanisms are seldom made explicit, the argument seems to be that devolving 
responsibility to the school level, and thus creating a sense of local ownership, will help 
ensure good management and financial control, responsiveness to local needs and long-
term sustainability.  It is in this light that some programmes put considerable emphasis on 
the role of “school management committees”. 
 
One result of the strategy of devolution to school-level is the atomised procurement 
activities that can be seen in some programmes where a cook may use a local market to 
procure food for an individual school (see e.g. the Ghana and Nigeria examples in Table 1).  
This raises important questions, particularly in relation to the ability to effectively structure 
demand.  One might assume, for example, that demand can only be effectively structured if 
and when a buyer can exercise a significant degree of power in a market.  This power might 
be associated with a number of factors: the scale of procurement in relation to the size of 
the market; the offer of premium prices; better payment terms and so on.  However, the 
scale of procurement might be the critical factor.  A cook going into a busy market on a daily 
or weekly basis to procure food for a single school (essentially a spot market transaction) 
might be expected to have relatively little power.  On the other hand, someone buying food 
on a much larger scale (e.g. for a number of schools and/or for a whole school year) would 
be in much stronger position to set or negotiate terms (i.e. quality, origin, delivery schedule, 
lot size etc) – in other words, to actively structure the demand.   
 
This points to what might be an important tension at the heart of HGSF: while devolution of 
day-to-day management may be desirable or even necessary in some situations, it may at 
the same time reduce the ability to structure demand, and thus undermine the HGSF theory 
of change.  A more detailed understanding of the factors enabling effective structuring of 
demand is required, with a particular emphasis on the question of scale. 
 
4.3. Delivery mechanisms for supply-side measures 
 
It is clear that there will be few if any agricultural development benefits from HGSF if there is no 
accompanying increase in farm productivity.  For many parts of SSA such productivity increases 
will be dependent on improved access to information, training, technology, inputs and 
production credit.  In other words, in addition to the whole question of how demand can be 
structured, there are significant coordination and delivery challenges that both state-funded 
agricultural extension services and NGOs may struggle to meet.  If structured demand is to have 
the desired effect it will be important to focus on “shortage of resources.”  As Lipton 
reminds us, the state should take care not to “unleash private investment demands without 
providing the resources to satisfy them” (Lipton 1962, p.651). 
 
In designing HGSF programmes the implications of different procurement models and scales 
of procurement for the effective and efficient provision of supply-side measures to family 
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farmers will need to be carefully considered.  Over the years there have been many different 
approaches to (a lot of criticism of) agricultural extension in SSA (Rivera 1996; Rivera and 
Sulaiman 2009).  On the other hand, similar models have played important roles in rapid 
agricultural change in other parts of the developing world, and in the last decade there has 
been much interest in new extension models based on “social learning” such as farmer field 
schools (Godtland et al. 2004; Van den Berg and Jiggins 2007).  It is critical that those 
promoting HGSF consider the implications of this experience for the provision of supply-side 
measures within HGSF, and specifically how the spatial dimensions of different procurement 
models likely to impact on the logistics and cost of provision. 
 
4.4. Effects on HGSF on schooling 
 
This paper has focused primarily on the agricultural development aspects of the HGSF, 
leaving the social protection side – the presumed benefits to children’s nutrition, health and 
schooling – unexamined (but see, e.g. Bundy et al. 2009). Nevertheless, there may be 
important interactions between these two sides of the HGSF proposition that deserve 
research attention.  Under what conditions does the level of centralisation or 
decentralisation of HGSF programmes create potential for scale economies and/or 
corruption, that then impact on the amount, quality or consistency of food available? Do 
these effects have the potential to affect attendance?  If, as envisaged, HGSF leads to 
domestic financing substituting for donor funding, will other elements of school budgets be 
reduced, thus impacting on the quality of the educational experience?  Finally, will HGSF 
strategies that favour local procurement and preparation make it difficult to integrate foods 
that have been fortified with micronutrients?  
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